Notice of dismissal prevails over motion to dismiss

Facts: 

Petitioner Frederick Dael filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses Benedicto and Vilma Beltran. Dael alleged that the Beltrans sold him a parcel of land without disclosing that the land was previously mortgaged. Possession and ownership of the property was delivered to him when he paid the bid price. Dael argued that Beltran’s non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under Article 1547 of the New Civil Code.  He likewise claimed that he was entitled to damages because he had to pay for the property twice.

On January 10, 2002, Sps. Beltran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Dael had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not Frederick Dael. In a hearing on the motion, Atty. Dirkie Y. Palma, Dael’s counsel, disclosed that petitioner Dael is the father of Frederick George Ghent Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the Contract to Sell dated July 28, 2000. Atty. Palma moved to reset the hearing to enable the petitioner to withdraw and have the complaint dismissed, amended, or to enter into a compromise agreement with respondents.

On February 20, 2002, Dael filed a Notice of Dismissal praying that the case be ordered dismissed without prejudice.

Finding merit to Sps. Beltran’s contention that Frederick Dael has no cause of action against them since said he is not one of the contracting parties in the Contract to Sell, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on Sps. Beltran’s Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal, Dael filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Hence, he appealed.

Dael contend that the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that before the defendant has served his answer or moved for a summary judgment, he has, as a matter of right, the prerogative to cause the dismissal of a civil action filed, and such dismissal may be effected by a mere notice of dismissal. He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the Notice of Dismissal filed is with or without prejudice and the RTC cannot exercise its own discretion and dismiss the case with prejudice.

Sps. Beltran argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by Dael and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.

Issue:

Did the RTC err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice?

Held: 

Yes. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. – A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment.  Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.  Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.

Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.

Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.

This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss.  The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment.  Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.

Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise. [Dael vs. Sps. Beltran, G.R. No. 156470,  April 30, 2008]

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The failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form

Facts: 

Reynaldo Poñado is charged with three counts of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659. The relationship of the victim to Poñado, however, was not accurately alleged in the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor. In all three informations the victim, 13-year old Mariner Bombales, has been stated to be the stepdaughter of the accused; yet, the evidence show that Reynaldo Poñado is but a "live-in partner" of the victim's mother, the latter being, in fact, lawfully married to one Marcelino Bombales. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be convicted of qualified rape.

Held: 

The accused should not be convicted of qualified rape. In qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties must be alleged in the information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information.

In the case at bar, the failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form that is punishable by death. The technical flaw is a matter that cannot be ignored. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to that of reclusion perpetua. [People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Poñado, G.R. No. 131334, July 28, 1999 - En Banc Vitug, J.]

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Where victim is a minor and related to the offender, both facts must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of qualified rape

Facts: 

Demetrio Nuñez was charged with raping his 14-year old daughter. However, the minority of the victim is not stated in the Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offended party as the daughter of the offender. The trial court convicted Nuñez with the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not Nuñez could be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.

Held: 

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1.  When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, x x x. Applying the aforesaid law, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon the accused, taking into account the minority of Janeth as she was only fourteen (14) years old at the time of the incident, as well as the relationship of father and daughter between the accused and the complainant. However, the penalty of death cannot be automatically imposed on the accused merely because of the trial court’s appreciation of both the fact of minority and relationship, no matter how clearly established. Jurisprudence dictates that these twin facts be alleged in the Information or Complaint before the death penalty can properly be imposed. Indeed, this Court has consistently held that the seven attendant circumstances under Section 11 of RA 7659 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating circumstances that may be proved even if not alleged, cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information. Thus, there being no allegation of minority in the Information under which accused was arraigned and tried in the case at bench, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape.

Penalty of Nuñez was reduced to reclusion perpetua. (People vs. Nuñez, G.R. No. 128875, 08 July 1999)

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An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused; exception

Facts: 

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.

Columna was arrested. On March 8, 2004, he executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.

The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.

The RTC judge Daguna denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed.

Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.

Awingan and the Antiporda's, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Held: 

Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Citation: Harold V. Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

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The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial.

A direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof"; or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances. (Soriaga vs Briones and People, G.R. No. 164682, September 14, 2011)

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The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to quash is to go to trial

● In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition. (Hilario P. Soriano vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010)

● In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling. (Soriaga vs Briones and People, G.R. No. 164682, September 14, 2011)

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Purpose of a motion to quash

The designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information. (Soriaga vs Briones and People, G.R. No. 164682, September 14, 2011)

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