The failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form

Facts: 

Reynaldo Poñado is charged with three counts of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659. The relationship of the victim to Poñado, however, was not accurately alleged in the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor. In all three informations the victim, 13-year old Mariner Bombales, has been stated to be the stepdaughter of the accused; yet, the evidence show that Reynaldo Poñado is but a "live-in partner" of the victim's mother, the latter being, in fact, lawfully married to one Marcelino Bombales. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be convicted of qualified rape.

Held: 

The accused should not be convicted of qualified rape. In qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties must be alleged in the information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information.

In the case at bar, the failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form that is punishable by death. The technical flaw is a matter that cannot be ignored. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to that of reclusion perpetua. [People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Poñado, G.R. No. 131334, July 28, 1999 - En Banc Vitug, J.]

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A municipal mayor cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible

Facts: 

Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant Crispin Velarde while he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997. He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled. On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him. Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde’s written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel. Armed police officers were also present during the investigation. The trial court found Velarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. On appeal, Velarde that the trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused.

Decision: 

Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.

As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of “operational supervision and control” over the police. “What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.” Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.

Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present “at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning.  If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.”

During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant.  The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession. It is clear that appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-bound to disregard it.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Crispin Velarde y Bandojo, G.R. No. 139333 July 18, 2002

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Municipal attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible in evidence

Facts: 

Appellant Elizalde Culala was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. With the accused pleading not guilty upon arraignment, trial ensued, The prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant admitting the commission of the crime, alleged to have been obtained in the presence and with the assistance of the municipal attorney, who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant placed reliance on the defense of denial and alibi. He pointed out that the extra-judicial confession executed by him suffered from constitutional infirmities and consequently, inadmissible as evidence because it was extracted under duress, force and intimidation and was only countersigned later by the Municipal Attorney. After trial, the court a quo came out with a judgment of conviction sentencing him to the penalty of death.

Decision: 

On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.  In People vs. Bandula, it was held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order.  It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Elizalde Culala y Bognot, G.R. No. 83466, October 13, 1999

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Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: 

Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Decision: 

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004

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