A municipal mayor cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible

Facts: 

Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant Crispin Velarde while he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997. He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled. On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him. Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde’s written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel. Armed police officers were also present during the investigation. The trial court found Velarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. On appeal, Velarde that the trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused.

Decision: 

Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.

As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of “operational supervision and control” over the police. “What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.” Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.

Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present “at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning.  If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.”

During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant.  The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession. It is clear that appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-bound to disregard it.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Crispin Velarde y Bandojo, G.R. No. 139333 July 18, 2002

Read More →

Municipal attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible in evidence

Facts: 

Appellant Elizalde Culala was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. With the accused pleading not guilty upon arraignment, trial ensued, The prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant admitting the commission of the crime, alleged to have been obtained in the presence and with the assistance of the municipal attorney, who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant placed reliance on the defense of denial and alibi. He pointed out that the extra-judicial confession executed by him suffered from constitutional infirmities and consequently, inadmissible as evidence because it was extracted under duress, force and intimidation and was only countersigned later by the Municipal Attorney. After trial, the court a quo came out with a judgment of conviction sentencing him to the penalty of death.

Decision: 

On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.  In People vs. Bandula, it was held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order.  It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Elizalde Culala y Bognot, G.R. No. 83466, October 13, 1999

Read More →

Barangay tanods including the barangay chairman may be deemed law enforcement officers; extra-judicial confession before them is inadmissible

Facts: 

Appellant Edna Malngan was convicted with arson. On appeal, she questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant.

Decision: 

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:

1. it must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr.  She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house.  The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Edna Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006

Read More →

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: 

Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Decision: 

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004

Read More →

Extra-judicial confession before a “bantay bayan" is inadmissible

Facts: 

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Decision: 

The Supreme Court held that  barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without  counsel was inadmissible in evidence. 

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010

Read More →