The rights guaranteed a person under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution are not available when he is not under custodial investigation

Facts: 

Private respondent Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, was charged with having unlawfully kept for himself the proceeds of the sale of plane tickets. Management informed him of the investigation to be conducted. Prior to the investigation, he informed management in writing of his willingness to settle the irregularities. At the investigation, Felipe’s answers in response to questions were taken down in writing. An information for estafa was filed later. During trial, the written offer of evidence included statement of the accused and his handwritten admission. The trial judge excluded the said evidence since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. The written admission was also made without the assistance of a counsel.

Held: 

The rights to which respondent Judge has given a construction exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." By custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

Felipe was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales. Thus, the statement or confession voluntarily given by him during the administrative investigation, that he had malversed his employer's funds is admissible although without a prior information of his rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution and without assistance of counsel. 

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Judge Ruben Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

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The Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years

Facts: 

Appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano was charged with the the crime of rape committed against his 16-year child. One of the witnesses of the prosecution was Elven Invencion, the 8-year-old son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. The trial court convicted Artemio. On appeal, he attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven’s testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions.

Held: 

Artemio cannot challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Artemio Invencion y Soriano, G.R. No. 142930, March 28, 2003

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A descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant; filial privilege can be invoked or waived like other privileges

Facts: 

Appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano was charged with the the crime of rape committed against his 16-year child. One of the witnesses of the prosecution was Elven Invencion, the 8-year-old son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. The trial court convicted Artemio. On appeal, he attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Held: 

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on “filial privilege.”  This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio.  Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only “to tell the truth.”

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Artemio Invencion y Soriano, G.R. No. 142930, March 28, 2003

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A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not a ground for a motion to quash; the right remedy is a motion for a bill of particulars

Facts: 

Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft. The Information states:

That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon, municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties...

Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally defective; there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The trial court denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.

Decision: 

The rules of criminal procedure declare that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the approximate time of the commission of the offense. Where, however, the statement of the time of the commission of the offense is so general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to August, 1912," it has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense.

A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment.

The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars.

The information against Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.

Citation: Felicisimo Rocaberte vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165879, G.R. No. 72994, January 23, 1991

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The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies to common law relationships

Facts: 

Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they acquire a certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.

Decision: 

The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.”

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling  property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.”

As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife, it was null and void. 

Citation: Ching vs Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006 citing Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984)

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For purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained to the total number of registered voters in each district

Facts: 

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. The Comelec certified Jesus James Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member with Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking member based on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. Pursuant to the Comelec resolution, DILG Secretary Alunan designated Calisin as acting Vice-Governor. 

Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, Victoria would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.

Decision: 

Section 44 of the Local Government Code provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice-governor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become vice-governor. "For purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election."

The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. Victoria's contention must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to the Court which has no power to change the law. 

Citation: Victoria vs Comelec, G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994

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A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules

Facts: 

Appellant Cañete was convicted of the crime of rape committed against a 12-year child. He assails decision of the trial court, contending that the trial court erred in participating directly and actively in the presentation and reception of the prosecution’s evidence thereby failing to uphold the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge. He avers that when the prosecution tried to elicit from the offended party how appellant’s penis could have been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and the appellant’s counsel objected to the question, the presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded questions on the private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions to the private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.

Decision: 

The Court does not agree with the appellant’s submission. In People v. Ancheta, this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui, this Court reiterated that:

In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness.  He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

There is nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court. Neither are the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his short pants.  Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the question of the public prosecutor “where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants” was not leading. The trial court should have overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the question. However, the trial court was not precluded from asking questions to avoid further wrangling between the public prosecutor and the appellant’s counsel which may frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a minor and who was unused to judicial proceedings.  After all, the trial court was mandated to discover the truth.

Citation: People of the Philippines vs Kakingcio Cañete, G.R. No. 142930, March 28, 2003

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