Facts:
Petitioner Frederick Dael filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses Benedicto and Vilma Beltran. Dael alleged that the Beltrans sold him a parcel of land without disclosing that the land was previously mortgaged. Possession and ownership of the property was delivered to him when he paid the bid price. Dael argued that Beltran’s non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under Article 1547 of the New Civil Code. He likewise claimed that he was entitled to damages because he had to pay for the property twice.
On January 10, 2002, Sps. Beltran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Dael had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not Frederick Dael. In a hearing on the motion, Atty. Dirkie Y. Palma, Dael’s counsel, disclosed that petitioner Dael is the father of Frederick George Ghent Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the Contract to Sell dated July 28, 2000. Atty. Palma moved to reset the hearing to enable the petitioner to withdraw and have the complaint dismissed, amended, or to enter into a compromise agreement with respondents.
On February 20, 2002, Dael filed a Notice of Dismissal praying that the case be ordered dismissed without prejudice.
Finding merit to Sps. Beltran’s contention that Frederick Dael has no cause of action against them since said he is not one of the contracting parties in the Contract to Sell, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on Sps. Beltran’s Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal, Dael filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Hence, he appealed.
Dael contend that the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that before the defendant has served his answer or moved for a summary judgment, he has, as a matter of right, the prerogative to cause the dismissal of a civil action filed, and such dismissal may be effected by a mere notice of dismissal. He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the Notice of Dismissal filed is with or without prejudice and the RTC cannot exercise its own discretion and dismiss the case with prejudice.
Sps. Beltran argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by Dael and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice?
Held:
On January 10, 2002, Sps. Beltran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Dael had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not Frederick Dael. In a hearing on the motion, Atty. Dirkie Y. Palma, Dael’s counsel, disclosed that petitioner Dael is the father of Frederick George Ghent Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the Contract to Sell dated July 28, 2000. Atty. Palma moved to reset the hearing to enable the petitioner to withdraw and have the complaint dismissed, amended, or to enter into a compromise agreement with respondents.
On February 20, 2002, Dael filed a Notice of Dismissal praying that the case be ordered dismissed without prejudice.
Finding merit to Sps. Beltran’s contention that Frederick Dael has no cause of action against them since said he is not one of the contracting parties in the Contract to Sell, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on Sps. Beltran’s Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal, Dael filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Hence, he appealed.
Dael contend that the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that before the defendant has served his answer or moved for a summary judgment, he has, as a matter of right, the prerogative to cause the dismissal of a civil action filed, and such dismissal may be effected by a mere notice of dismissal. He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the Notice of Dismissal filed is with or without prejudice and the RTC cannot exercise its own discretion and dismiss the case with prejudice.
Sps. Beltran argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by Dael and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice?
Held:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.
This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise. [Dael vs. Sps. Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008]
SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. – A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.
This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise. [Dael vs. Sps. Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008]
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