Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
Columna was arrested. On March 8, 2004, he executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.
The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.
The RTC judge Daguna denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.
Awingan and the Antiporda's, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Held:
Columna was arrested. On March 8, 2004, he executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.
The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.
The RTC judge Daguna denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.
Awingan and the Antiporda's, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Held:
Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Citation: Harold V. Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
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